**Title:** Support for populist candidates in 2016 presidential election and Democratic primary predicted by reduced social capital and deaths of despair

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**Abstract**

...

**Introduction**

*“All of us, from cradle to grave, are happiest when life is organized as a series of excursions, long or short, from the secure base provided by our attachment figures.”* [*(Bowlby, 1988)*](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/BAVL)

Researchers across a range of disciplines have had a long standing interest in how social changes affect voting patterns and a consensus on some general patterns has emerged. It is widely agreed, for example, that most of the electorate operates with very little information about the candidates and both positions on issues and voting behavior are largely characterized by ignorance, political illiteracy, framing effects and incoherence [(Bartels, 1996; B. Berelson, 1952; B. R. Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & MacPhee, 1954; A. Campbell & University of Michigan Survey, 1980; Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Converse, 1964; Kinder, 1998; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & McPhee, 1954; Sinderman, 1993)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/7gQj+EwZN+aiUY+6E6o+S0Kc+uKst+MsM1+az0W+uUwj). Some researchers have argued that such widespread ignorance does not matter because poorly informed voters make efficient use of relevant cues in the social and political environment to make informed choices [(B. R. Berelson et al., 1954; McKelvey & Ordeshook, 1985; Page & Shapiro, 2010; Russell Neuman, 1986)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/7gQj+DIaq+4ytv+KM2t) or because individual errors tend to cancel out in the electorate at large [(Condorcet, n.d.; Converse, 1990; N. R. Miller, 1986; Shapiro, 1992; Wittman, 1989)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/538E+6Kfe+331o+C37s+e8Bb). Most political scientists also agree that there is a strong relationship between partisanship and political opinions ([(Bartels, 2000, 2002; Erikson, 2004; M. Fiorina, 1981; W. E. Miller, 1991; Wlezien, Franklin, & Twiggs, 1997)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/b2Tv+dXz9+mWz9+ISjg+TCUx+Igr4) that political polarization is increasing to leves not see since the American Civil War [(M. P. Fiorina & Abrams, 2008; Hare & Poole, 2014)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/HZ8B+lajd) and that party affiliation is stubbornly resistant to change [(Alwin & Krosnick, 1991; Jennings & Niemi, 1974; Niemi & Jennings, 1991)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/Nw3E+pAoy+kpsJ). In other words, voters are more loyal to political party or group than they are to any particular policy and it is widely acknowledged that in the United States and across much of Europe this tribalism has been on the rise since the 1990’s [(Doherty, 2014; Haidt, 2012; McCarty, Poole, & Rosenthal, 2016; Westfall, Van Boven, Chambers, & Judd, 2015)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/Poer+BJb1+6TQo+jPJ5).

Despite widespread agreement amongst political scientists that voters fail to vote on issues and in many cases are not even aware of them, there remains considerable debate about which factors do influence how people vote. Some, for example, have argued that cultural factors and feelings of group identity have stronger effects on voting behavior than personal economic interests [(Clark, Lipset, & Rempel, 1993)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/KzPG);[(Achterberg & Houtman, 2006)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/veF0); [(Frank, 2004)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/eW8I). Others have argued that moral values are the best predictors of voting behavior [(Graham et al., 2012; Haidt, 2012)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/Poer+XJKC) and one study showed that placing higher value on the individual and issues of harm and fairness predicted support for Barack Obama, whereas placing more of an emphasis on groups and the moral values of loyalty, authority and purity predicted support for Mitt Romney [(Franks, Scherr - Analyses of Social Issues and Public, & 2015, 2015)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/wZoK). Behavioral economists Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky have formulated ‘Prospect theory’ to describe the way that people choose between probabilistic alternatives involving risk. According to this view voters are expected to use simple heuristics based on the potential value of losses and gains rather than on the final outcome to make decisions [(Kahneman & Tversky, 2012)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/LVh6). Key findings from prospect theory show that people are more risk averse when it comes to gains (e.g. most people prefer $100 for certain over an even chance to win $200 or nothing), are more tolerant of risk when it comes to losses (e.g. most people find a certain loss of $100 more aversive than an even chance to lose $200 or nothing) and are more sensitive to losses than to gains (e.g. losing $500 is more unpleasant than than the pleasure associated with winning $500). In politics this suggests that under normal conditions the incumbent has the advantage because people are more risk averse towards potential or actual gains but that the challenger has the advantage when times are tough because loss aversion increases tolerance for risk [(Quattrone & Tversky, 1988)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/GRaV). Meanwhile, many social psychologists have argued that voting behavior functions to fulfill deep seated emotional needs of the voter. This type of explanation is typified by books like *The Authoritarian Personality* [(Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, & Levinson, 1950)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/g3Pi). Finally many evolutionary theorists have sought to understand voting behavior in terms of ingroup and outgroup loyalties and identity[(Petersen & Aarøe, 2012)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/LTkj). Ingroup biases are known to have as strong influence on the persuasiveness of political arguments (Arceneaux, 2012) and are frequently more predictive of attitudes on issues like climate change[(Hornsey, Harris, Bain, & Fielding, 2016; Kahan et al., 2012)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/S7cK+uHc6) and evolution than scientific literacy[(Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/doRF). Ethnic homogeneity has also been cited as a major cause of electoral support for redistribution[(Alesina, Glaeser, & Glaeser, 2004; Larsen, 2011)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/MC1E+gMsa) suggesting that perceptions of ingroup cohesion can have important effects on political views.

All of these factors have been used to explain the results and dynamics of the 2016 presidential election in the United States — an election which has forced many to re-examine previously held beliefs about voting behavior and which has challenged political orthodoxy (Poniewozik, 2016). At the beginning of the 2016 presidential primary season, Hillary Clinton and Jeb Bush were seen by many as the inevitable nominees of their respective parties (Enten, 2016; Collinson and Jaffe, 2015). By the end of that year the insurgent campaigns of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders had thrown both major parties into turmoil (Greenwald, 2017; Rubin, 2017; Todd et al., 2017). Sanders, a virtual unknown independent senator from Vermont had almost won the nomination for the Democratic party and Donald Trump who was considered a long shot or joke by most political insiders won the GOP nomination and ultimately the presidency.The fallout from this historic election is still being felt, so a consensus on what happened has yet to emerge. Some of the most common explanations for Trump’s victory and Sanders — a virtual unknown in early 2016 — surprising competitiveness for the DNC nomination, include the abandonment of working class voters in favor of professional elites [(Frank, 2007)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/btUP), why poor, rural and uneducated whites vote against their economic interests [(Frank, 2004, 2012; G. Lakoff, 2008)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/UN44+CoGp+eW8I), cultural explanations [(Inglehart & Norris, 2016)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/HM1N), the complex and changing role of religion [(T. Campbell, 2017; Smidt, 2017)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/9Psa+m4Os); Smith & Martínez, 2016), the role of lobbyists and corporations [(Berry & Wilcox, 2018)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/C8WO) the role of social media, propaganda and ‘fake news’ [(Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Faris et al., 2017)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/k8vU+XpIL) and an increasing importance of identity politics [(Cramer, 2016; Hochschild, 2016; Lilla, 2016)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/68uj+jueW+NBGW).

The candidacies of Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump have been widely viewed as insurgent populist revolts[(Hawkins & Kaltwasser, 2018; Jensen & Bang, 2017; Nilsson, 2018)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/rJqX+uG7y+gP1O). Populists tend to separate the world into the two categories — the corrupt elites and the righteous common people [(Mudde - Government and opposition & 2004, 2004; Orbach, 2017; Stanley - Journal of political ideologies & 2008, 2008)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/RhhE+DnOz+FJHE) and symbolize a break from the political establishment [(Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/SbPZ). They are frequently are viewed as leading the people against entrenched power, elites and traditional ideas [(Abts & Rummens, 2007; Canovan, 1999)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/nM26+pzDc). Because who one considers to be an elite depends on your political beliefs, populism can emerge from either side of the political spectrum [(Bale, van Kessel, & Taggart, 2011)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/QqqQ). Overall, however, populist movements arising on the left or the right are seen to benefit from declining trust in politicians [(Hetherington - American Political Science Review & 1999, 1999)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/PHep).

Europe has also seen a dramatic recent rise in the number and popularity of populist candidates [(T. Campbell, 2017; Swank & Betz, 2003; Vieten & Poynting, 2016; Wodak, Mral, & KhosraviNik, 2013)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/xCxx+m4Os+03KT+POuK) and some of the most widely held explanations for this recent increase across both Europe and the United States could be characterized as the ‘economic inequality theory’ [(Inglehart & Norris, 2016)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/HM1N). Proponents of this view argue that the dramatic rise in economic inequality arising from globalization has fueled popular resentment of the political classes [(Hirsh, 2016; Piketty, 2017)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/7vVh+Zrzu). Historical evidence that major financial shocks are frequently followed by an increase in support for populist candidates [(Stankov, 2018)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/YFvh) supports this view. A recent cross national study of financial panics has found that the worst crises always lead to a surge in populism[(Dalio, 2018)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/lkFO). In general research suggests that financial crises tend to radicalize voters such that the share of centrists decreases and the proportion of extremists increases [(Mian & Sufi, 2015; Sufu, 2016)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/LZuw+6Txa). Another common explanation is the ‘cultural backlash theory’ [(Inglehart & Norris, 2016)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/HM1N) which proposes that the rise in support for populist parties is best explained as a reaction to the rapid progressive cultural change and adoption of a multiculturalist worldview (e.g environmentalism, gender equality, human rights) adopted by the elites in many western democracies [(Inglehart, 1977, 1990, 1997)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/D57i+e7Z0+q7hX).

An alternative to the economic inequality, financial shocks cultural backlash theories for the rise of populism is what might be called the ‘social isolation theory’. Aristotle famously wrote, “man is by nature a social animal” [(Peck, 1993)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/5Unx) and since that time researchers across a variety of fields including anthropology [(Henrich, 2004)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/2Hr7), developmental psychology [(Enfield & Levinson, 2006)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/XvBs) and biology [(Plutchik, 2001)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/YKu7) have all provided support for this famous aphorism. Bowlby, the father of attachment theory argued that human sociality is constructed around kin and a few close relationships [(Bowlby, 1988)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/BAVL). The recent decline of social capital (i.e. the norms and networks that enable people to act collectively) and the closely related deterioration of social networks in many of the less educated and less populated regions of the United States has been well documented [(“Left Behind America,” n.d.; R. Putnam, 2000; R. D. Putnam, 2007; Wuthnow, 2018)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/56Gy+3hte+1tuJ+ZKW3). People in these areas interact with each other less frequently, have fewer close social relationships, are more distrustful, volunteer less often and take less active roles in their neighborhoods and communities [(R. Putnam, 2000)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/56Gy). Some researchers have suggested that these trends and the increasing social isolation experienced by people in these communities is responsible for people turning to drugs or alcohol and rising suicide rates[(Case & Deaton, 2015, 2017)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/WVE3+FvPM). Life expectancy at birth increased by 1.4 years for whites, 2.6 years for Hispanics and 3.6 years for non-hispanic blacks between 2000 and 2014 [(Kochanek, Arias, & Bastian, 2016)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/qe1a). However, among poorly educated, white, men and women between the ages of 35 and 60, these modest mortality declines have been more than offset by deaths from drug overdoses, alcohol poisoning and suicide [(Dasgupta et al., 2014; Volkow, 2014)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/qZkL+amQn). Case and Deaton [(2015)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/FvPM/?noauthor=1) have called these “deaths of despair” and argue that these patterns move together over birth cohorts in concert with other social dysfunctions, such as the decline of marriage, social isolation, and detachment from the labor force. They write that these patterns are consistent with the “collapse of the white working class after its heyday in the early 1970s, and the pathologies that accompany that decline” [(Case & Deaton, 2017)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/WVE3). Durkheim argued that suicides are the result of social factors including rapid economic and social change or a decline in social networks and bonds [(Durkheim, 1897)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/9S2m) and attachment disorders are known to play an important role in both addiction [(Alexander, 2010; Depner, 2017; De Rick, Vanheule, & Verhaeghe, 2009; Flores, 2004; Hari, 2015; Maté, 2010)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/sG4q+3DEU+o8AR+pevA+AsG8+bRVO) and suicide [(Fonagy, 2000; Goldberg, Muir, & Kerr, 2013; Grunebaum et al., 2010; Hjern, Lindblad, & Vinnerljung, 2002)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/xgk3+Cu5M+tDLd+AsJg). Overall, both attachment and social capital theory predict that social relationships are crucial for mental health and and that their absence can result in dire consequences for individuals and communities.

This collapse in social capital can have political consequences. Kornhauser [(2013)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/a8Sa/?noauthor=1), for example, argues that Fascist movements appeal to the least integrated segments of the middle class while communist movements appeal to the least integrated elements of the working class while Arendt [(Arendt, 1973)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/fczZ) claims that individual isolation and loneliness are preconditions for totalitarian movements [(Arendt, 1973)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/fczZ). In conjunction with the prediction that voters are expected to be more tolerant of risk when faced with losses as suggested by prospect theory [(Kahneman & Tversky, 2012)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/LVh6) the collapse of social networks can induce voters to accept the greater risks of supporting an unknown outsider, like Trump or Sanders. Globalization [(Wuthnow, 2018)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/ZKW3), the rise of social media[(Sunstein, 2018)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/ofJ7) and the decline of social capital can all conspire to undermine social cohesion [(R. Putnam, 2000)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/56Gy) and these effects have been particularly corrosive in rural communities.

This study seeks to understand whether the support for populist candidates in the 2016 presidential race can be better explained by a decline in social capital than by deteriorating economic conditions, a backlash against cultural changes or other important demographic changes in the US population resulting from immigration. We use county level mortality data from the Center for Disease Control (CDC), on suicides, drug overdoses and death related to alcoholism as a proxy for social capital to predict support for populist presidential candidates in the 2016 primaries and the general election. We predict **(P1)** that in counties with with higher rates of these deaths deaths, there will be more support for Donald Trump than for Hillary Clinton. We also predict **(P2**) that there will be more support for Sanders than for Clinton in the democratic primary in counties with higher rates of these types of deaths. We will also analyze how these relationship are influenced by various economic and demographic factors such as population density, median level of education, median income, unemployment rate and county diversity and how county level support for Democratic and Republican presidential candidates has changed since the 2008 economic collapse.

**Methods:**

Social capital variables were found here on the Pennsylvania State University [Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development](https://aese.psu.edu/nercrd):

<https://aese.psu.edu/nercrd/community/social-capital-resources/social-capital-variables-for-2014/social-capital-variables-spreadsheet-for-2014/view>

These are the variables:

religious2014: Number of establishments in Religious organizations

civic2014: Number of establishments in Civic and social associations

business2014: Number of establishments in Business associations

political2014: Number of establishments in Political organizations

professional2014: Number of establishments in Professional organizations

labor2014: Number of establishments in Labor organization

bowling2014: Number of establishments in Bowling center

recreational2014: Number of establishments in Fitness and Recreational Sports Centers golf2014: Number of establishments in Golf Courses and Country Clubs

sports2014: Number of establishments in Sports Teams and Clubs

pop2014: Population

assn2014: The aggregate for all of above variables divided by population per 1,000 (1st factor) pvote2012: Voter turnout (2nd factor)

respn2010: Census response rate (3rd factor)

nccs2014: Number of non-profit organizations without including those with an international approach (4th factor)

sk2014: Social capital index created using principal component analysis using the above four factors (this is divided by population per 10,000). The four factors are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, and the first principal component is considered as the index of social capital.

The diversity index: “One way to understand what has been taking place recently in the Midwest is through the use of a [measure](https://www.esri.com/library/whitepapers/pdfs/diversity-index-methodology.pdf) called the [diversity index](https://proximityone.wordpress.com/2016/10/22/diversity-by-state-2015/). This index ranks geographic areas — states, counties and ZIP codes — on a scale from 0 to 100. The higher the number, the more likely that two people chosen at random will be different by race and origin. Put another way, a higher number means more diversity, a lower number, less diversity.”

To protect against the potential disclosure of personal health information, CDC WONDER suppresses any statistic (counts or rates) calculated using fewer than 10 observations. To get the suppressed rows for a particular year we extracted the death data for all years (1999-2016) and then subtracted the mortality data of every year except for the year wanted (e.g. 2016 or 2008) to significantly decrease the number of suppressed rows. This lowered the number of suppressed rows from around 1,800 to 300. After this we predicted the remaining suppressed rows by 1: summing all populations of counties with suppressed rows grouped by state (to get missing population) 2: dividing each missing county population by the total missing population (to get a population ratio) 3: summing suicide counts for all complete rows grouped by state (to get the total known deaths) 4: subtracting the complete sum from the state total (to get the total number of missing deaths) 5: multiplying the missing total by the population ratio. Election data was taken from the U.S. election atlas, diversity index data came from the Environmental Systems Research Institute and the remaining demographic data is from the U.S. census bureau.

Election data:

<https://data.opendatasoft.com/explore/dataset/usa-2016-presidential-election-by-county%40public/export/>

Dealing with suppressed CDC data:

“CDC WONDER (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Wide-Ranging Online Data for Epidemiologic Research) provides county-level data on directly age-adjusted mortality rates, and age- and gender-stratified mortality and population counts.1 To protect against the potential disclosure of personal health information, WONDER suppresses any statistic (counts or rates) calculated using fewer than 10 observations.2 However, such suppression restricts the utility of WONDER data to compute and map reliable rates for areas with small populations, for short time periods, or for rare diseases.3,4 Furthermore, rates that are indirectly adjusted for age, which are currently not provided by WONDER, can only be calculated for those counties where count data are not suppressed.5,6 “[(Tiwari, Beyer, & Rushton, 2014)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/QhiA)

“WONDER data release policies state that the term “Suppressed” replaces subnational death counts and rates, as well as corresponding population figures, when the figure represents 0 to 9 persons.2 However, population figures corresponding to suppressed data cells are only suppressed when the population counts themselves are between 0 and 9 persons. Because population counts in any cell are rarely fewer than 10 persons, it is possible to compute an expected mortality count for most suppressed cells by multiplying their corresponding population by the applicable regional mortality rate. Our age-adjustment algorithm reduced the impact of data suppression by substituting such an expected value for a suppressed value. “[(Tiwari et al., 2014)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/QhiA)

Counties range in size from 1 million LA county to Loving TX with just 86 people (check this)

New methods for imputing the missing data are in r code in working papers file

Steps: Bracket by years to limit the censored data- 2000 suicides = 2000-2008 suicides - 2001-2008 suicides, 2001 suicides = 2001-2009 suicides - 2002-2009 suicides…..

Using this method for 2015 we got 270 suppressed counties out of 3147 counties.

Mean of state = ((mean of uncensored counties \* population of uncensored counties) +[mean of censored counties] \* population of censored counties))/ (Population censored + Population uncensored). Solve for mean of uncensored counties

**Results:**

Model selection

We used candidate sets of all the combinations of the predictor variables to model each of the four dependent variables described above (see Methods) in a Generalized Linear Model regression in R Studio 3.4.1. We fitted models with the package ‘lme4’ and used the ‘MuMIn’ package to fit all combinations of the predictor variables. We ranked the models by Akaike’s Information Criterion Score used all variables within 2 AICc units of the top-ranked model and averaged across them by their weight (see supplementary materials tables S1:S12). The final predictor variables used were considered to be ‘informative’ and were seen as being the most useful in striking a balance between model complexity and overfitting [(Burnham & Anderson, 2002)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/MEHM) .

We evaluated model performance by calculating the area under the curve (AUC) of the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) for each of the top models [(Fielding & Bell, 1997)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/6oCJ). The AUC evaluates a model’s performance by indicating how well the model predicts a subject’s response to the dependent variable. An AUC value of 1.0 indicates perfect predictability, and a value of 0.5 indicates the model’s predictability is equal to random. We considered values with 95% Confidence Intervals (CI’s) that did not overlap with 0.5 to be reasonable models [(Boyce, Vernier, Nielsen, & Schmiegelow, 2002)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/TevG).

Models

**Discussion:**

When increased risk tolerance in the face of losses is combined with increasing anxiety, populist candidates with an unknown track record of public service may be more appealing or acceptable.

One of the most robust and consistent predictors of conservative political views is risk tolerance and aversion with liberals having a much higher tolerance for risk than conservatives [(Bargh, 2017; David Navarrete, 2017; Haidt, 2011; Huang, Sedlovskaya, Ackerman, & Bargh, 2011; George Lakoff, 2010; Nail, McGregor, Drinkwater, Steele, & Thompson, 2009)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/Dw3b+Oo6w+LDd2+PQso+HFcx+EReG).

Trump won because uncertainty and worsening conditions for many was combined with fear.

First nations people of Canada. Cultural continuity and the pace of cultural change have been identified as important factors increasing the risk of suicide amongst Canada’s first nations people [(Chandler & Lalonde, 1998)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/XKVl)and social isolation has been seen as a cause of mortality and health causes amongst first nations people in North America [(King, Smith, & Gracey, 2009)](https://paperpile.com/c/j7vzU0/YPW6).

How the DNC lost its populist soul from the Atlantic:

Populism incited by “Americans feel a lack of control: They are at the mercy of distant forces, their livelihoods dependent on the arbitrary whims of power. “ Elites and rich entered congress, people without college degrees were shunned and marginalized. The watergate babies(e.g. Clinton etc… ) remade the new deal. Corporations were no longer the enemy.

“ Modern liberals tend to confuse a broad social-welfare state and redistribution of resources in the form of tax-and-spend policies with the New Deal. In fact, the central tenet of New Deal competition policy was not big or small government; it was distrust of concentrations of power and conflicts of interest in the economy. The New Deal divided power, pitting faction against other faction, a classic Jefferson-Madison approach to controlling power (think [Federalist Paper No. 10](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federalist_No._10)). Competition policy meant preserving democracy within the commercial sphere, by keeping markets open. Again, for New Deal populists like Brandeis and Patman, it was democracy or concentrated wealth—but not both.”

“For decades after World War II, preventing economic concentration was understood as a bulwark against tyranny. But since the 1970s, this rhetoric has seemed ridiculous. “

The populist response to the 2008 economic crisis - Tea party vs Occupy wall street. One blamed the government, the other blamed the banks.

READ THIS

https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/10/how-democrats-killed-their-populist-soul/504710/?utm\_source=fbb

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